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Adjudicating Health-Related Rights: Proposed 
Considerations for the United Nations Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and Other Supra-
National Tribunals 
Alicia Ely Yamin and Angela Duger 
Abstract 
 
This article examines how various supra-national tribunals have approached 
adjudication of health-related rights, and makes proposals with respect to some special 
considerations posed by health-related cases that the United Nations Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights and other supra-national bodies will invariably face. After briefly 
setting out the contours of the right to health under international law, we stress the importance 
of an approach to adjudication that acknowledges underlying determinants, but also that defines 
the obligations of the health sector, explicitly acknowledging the interdependence and 
indivisibility of health with human rights. Second, reviewing some lessons from other supra-
national tribunals, we address the question of when a supra-national tribunal should order 
interim measures in a health-rights related case. Third, we explore the uniquely important role 
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of technical evidence in health rights cases, which are highly reliant on clinical and 
epidemiological determinations in establishing what reasonableness requires of the state. Fourth, 
we assert that achieving health equity goes beyond accounting for socio-economic marginalization 
or discrimination faced by certain populations, to examining priorities in relation to the “worst 
off” in terms of the seriousness of conditions. Finally, we argue both for the appropriateness of 
“dialogical” remedies in many health rights cases, and the need for developing innovative forms 
of monitoring and supervision of such remedies by supra-national tribunals. 
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I.  PROLOGUE  
Camila Abuabara, a Colombian university student, was first diagnosed with 
acute lymphoblastic leukemia in 2010. In 2013, suffering a relapse, she went to a 
hospital affiliated with the Sanitas insurance company, through which she had 
coverage. She spent three days without receiving appropriate examinations or 
treatment, finally checking herself into a different hospital to get care. Her doctor 
determined that Camila required an allogeneic stem cell transplant, which should 
have been covered under the obligatory insurance scheme in Colombia (Plan 
Obligatorio de Salud, or POS). However, during a second remission, Camila faced 
a series of bureaucratic hurdles and misinformation from Sanitas, apparently in 
order to save $30,000,000 Colombian pesos (approximately $9,480 USD at 2013 
currency conversion rates). This was the stated difference between the cost of the 
appropriate non-autologous transplant and the autologous stem cell transplant, 
which the company had authorized. Upon receiving a personal communication 
from Camila, the Colombian Minister of Health, Alejandro Gaviria, intervened on 
her behalf to compel Sanitas to perform the appropriate surgery. However, the 
inordinate delays meant that blastocysts were again detectable in her blood, 
making it clinically ill-advised to perform the procedure.1  
In 2014, Camila petitioned a Colombian court to order Sanitas to pay for her 
treatment at the MD Anderson Cancer Center in Houston, Texas, a global leader 
in cancer research and care. There, doctors had previously performed an 
experimental treatment on similarly situated patients with acute lymphoblastic 
leukemia in the third remission, with a 63% success rate. Colombia did not have 
such treatment available within the country. One court issued a protection writ 
(tutela) in favor of Camila’s claim to a violation of her fundamental rights to life 
and health, despite some irregularities in the writ.2 As such treatment abroad is 
not covered in the POS—and therefore Sanitas would not be expected to cover 
the cost—the government was provisionally ordered by the court to cover the 
estimated $678,000 USD from the Solidarity and Guarantee Fund (FOSYGA).3 
Minister Gaviria, who had previously advocated on Camila’s behalf with Sanitas, 
then intervened to challenge the court decision.4 He argued that providing such 
expensive treatment for one person could end up denying many others needed 
                                                 
1  See Norbey Quevedo H. y María Mónica Falla, La Nueva Batalla de Camila Abuabara, EL ESPECTADOR 
(Nov. 4, 2014), http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/investigacion/nueva-batalla-de-camila-
abuabara-articulo-525735. 
2  Abelardo de la Espriella v. EPS Sanitas S.A., Juzgado Vientiocho Penal Municipal Con Función 
Contol de Garantias, Medida Provisional - Acción de Tutela 2014-00095 (Bogotá, Nov. 1, 2014) 
(Colom.). 
3  Id. 
4  Id. at ¶ 4. 
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care and distorting the system.5 A second court revoked the protection writ.6 After 
receiving a bone marrow transplant in Colombia in December 2014 at a Sanitas 
hospital, Camila passed away on February 24, 2015.7  
What should the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ESC Rights Committee), or another treaty-monitoring body 
(TMB) or supra-national tribunal, do if it were to receive a petition in such a case, 
before Camila’s demise, as a matter of interim or precautionary measures? What 
kinds of evidence would the ESC Rights Committee, or another supra-national 
tribunal, want to evaluate if a case were brought upon the plaintiff’s death, arguing 
that the death was the direct result of the systematic lack of oversight and 
regulation of the health system? What sorts of remedies would be appropriate in 
such a case, if a violation were found? How might structural recommendations be 
effectively monitored?  
II.  INTRODUCTION  
As in Camila’s case, health rights cases often present tragic scenarios 
involving life and death decisions. These decisions are not only technical ones, but 
inexorably involve deeply contested moral values, balances between the interests 
of identified patients and anonymous suffering, and competing considerations 
among different kinds of patients and social values. Courts are increasingly 
involved in making such decisions as health rights are more and more frequently 
adjudicated at the national level across many middle income and, increasingly, low 
income countries.8 Different patterns of access to justice and enforcement, as well 
as the reactions of ministries of health to such litigation, mean that this 
phenomenon has varying equity impacts across countries.9  
                                                 
5  Id. 
6  Id. 
7  See id. See also Deicy J. Pareja M., 'Camila Tuvo Esperanzas Hasta el Día de su Muerte': Familiares 
Relatan los Últimos Días de la Joven que Luchó por Conseguir un Trasplante de Médula, EL 
TIEMPO (Feb. 28, 2015), http://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/medellin/testimonio-de-familiares-
de-camila-abuabara-tras-su-muerte/15302796. 
8  See Daniel Brinks & William Forbath, The Role of Courts and Constitutions in the New Politics of Welfare 
in Latin America, in LAW AND DEVELOPMENT OF MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES: AVOIDING THE 
MIDDLE-INCOME TRAP 221–45 (Randall Peerenboom & Tom Ginsburg eds., 2014); César 
Rodríguez-Garavito, The Judicialization of Health Care: Symptoms, Diagnosis, and Prescriptions, in LAW 
AND DEVELOPMENT OF MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES: AVOIDING THE MIDDLE-INCOME TRAP 
246–69 (Randall Peerenboom & Tom Ginsburg eds., 2014); The Center for Health Human Rights 
and Development & 4 Ors v Nakaseke District Local Administration [2015] UGHC XX (30 April 
2015). 
9  See LITIGATING HEALTH RIGHTS: CAN COURTS BRING MORE JUSTICE TO HEALTH? (Alicia Ely 
Yamin & Siri Gloppen eds., 2011); COURTING SOCIAL JUSTICE: JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF SOCIAL 
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With the entry into force of the Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), we will see a 
greater number of health-related rights presented to ESC Rights Committee, as 
well as other TMBs. Path-breaking cases have already been brought under the 
Optional Protocol to the Convention on Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).10 More will no doubt be brought 
under the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disability (CRPD) and the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). We are also likely to see increasing 
numbers of health-related claims framed in terms of the right to a life of dignity 
and other civil rights under other treaties, such as the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Indeed, the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) have also 
already begun to adjudicate health-related claims.11 
This article examines how various supra-national tribunals have approached 
adjudication of health-related rights. It also makes proposals with respect to some 
special considerations posed by health-related cases that the ESC Rights 
Committee and other TMBs and supra-national tribunals will invariably face, 
                                                 
AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD (Varun Gauri & Daniel M. Brinks eds., 
2008). 
10  See Comm’n. on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), Views: 
Communication No. 17/2008, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/49/D/17/2008 (Jul. 25, 2011) [hereinafter 
CEDAW, Alyne da Silva] (known as the Alyne da Silva Pimentel Teixeira case). 
11  For cases from the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) see M.S. v. Sweden, 1997-IV Eur. 
Ct. H.R. 1437 (concerning the privacy of health data); Z. v. Finland, 1997-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 323 
(concerning the privacy of health data); K.H. & Others v. Slovakia, 2009-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 389 
(concerning access to health records); V.C. v. Slovakia, 2011-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 381 (concerning 
sterilization without consent); N.B. v. Slovakia, App. No. 29518/10, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/ 
eng?i=001-111427 (2012) (concerning sterilization without consent); Cyprus v. Turkey, 2001-IV 
Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, ¶ 219 (holding that a violation of the right to life occurs “where it is shown that 
the authorities . . . put an individual’s life at risk through the denial of health care which they have 
undertaken to make available to the population generally”); Nevmerzhitsky v. Ukraine, 2005-II Eur. 
Ct. H.R. 307 (concerning the denial of health care to detainee amounting to degrading treatment); 
D. v. The United Kingdom, 1997-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 777 (concerning consideration of access to 
medications under the right to life if petitioner were deported); Yakovenko v. Ukraine, App. No. 
15825/06, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-82987 (2007) (concerning prisoners’ access to 
AIDS and TB treatment). For cases from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) 
see Suárez Peralta v. Ecuador, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 261 (May 21, 2013) (concerning state 
regulation of health care provision); Ximenes-Lopes v. Brazil, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 149 
(July 4, 2006) (concerning the treatment of a patient in a mental health facility); Caesar v. Trinidad 
and Tobago, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 123 (Mar. 11, 2005) (concerning corporal punishment 
of prisoner); Juvenile Reeducation Institute v. Paraguay, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 112 (Sept. 
2, 2004) (concerning the care and wellbeing of juvenile inmates in a detention center). See also Case 
of Suárez Peralta v. Ecuador, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 261, at 65 (May 21, 2013) (Mac-
Gregor Poisot, J., concurring) (arguing that the Court should have “approached the problem taking 
into account what really caused this case to reach the inter-American system . . . which was the 
implications for the ‘right to health’”). 
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some of which are poignantly raised in Camila’s case.12 We first briefly set out the 
contours of the right to health in its core formulation under international law, 
stressing the importance of an approach to adjudication that acknowledges 
underlying determinants but also defines the obligations of the health sector, 
explicitly acknowledging the interdependence and indivisibility of health with 
human rights. Second, reviewing some lessons from other supra-national 
tribunals, we address the question of when the ESC Rights Committee should 
order interim measures in a health-rights related case, and argue that such relief 
should focus on structural and collective cases rather than life-saving measures for 
individuals. Third, we explore the uniquely important role of technical evidence 
in health rights cases, which are highly reliant on clinical and epidemiological 
evidence in establishing what reasonableness requires, as illustrated by Camila’s 
case. However, we also emphasize that technical judgments can obscure important 
normative contestation about values that underlie choices in health, and therefore 
we argue that varying types of third-party interventions are especially appropriate 
in many health cases that raise questions at the borders of private morality and 
public policy. Fourth, we examine different approaches to reasonableness 
standards in economic and social rights cases that have been used by constitutional 
and high courts, and assert that achieving substantive equality in health goes 
beyond accounting for socio-economic marginalization or discrimination faced by 
certain populations, to examining priorities in relation to the “worst off” in terms 
of the seriousness of conditions. Finally, we turn to remedies, arguing both for 
the appropriateness of structural and “dialogical” remedies in many health rights 
cases, and the need for developing innovative forms of monitoring and 
supervision of such remedies by the ESC Rights Committee and other supra-
national tribunals, in order to enhance effective compliance and ultimate impact. 
Throughout the article, we suggest that examining the rights of individuals, 
such as Camila, in a vacuum exacerbates both health and social inequity. Rather, 
what is called for is a purposive approach that construes the health system as a 
core social institution and a reflection of the normative commitments to equal 
dignity of all people entitled to services under that system, which the state has 
                                                 
12  This article draws from research and review of the field, the experience of one author in three 
regions over more than a decade, advising judiciaries, and advocates bringing strategic health-related 
litigation (AEY). For purposes of this article, we define supra-national tribunals as the UN treaty 
monitoring bodies, regional courts, and regional human rights systems (including the Inter-
American Commission and the African Commission). We are examining the process and procedure 
of adjudicating of human rights rather than the binding nature of decisions. 
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made under international law.13 As South African Constitutional Court Justice 
Albie Sachs noted in a health rights case,  
[w]hen rights by their very nature are shared and inter-dependent, striking 
appropriate balances between the equally valid entitlements or expectations 
of a multitude of claimants should not be seen as imposing limits on those 
rights …, but as defining the circumstances in which the rights may most 
fairly and effectively be enjoyed.14  
Further, we conclude that international judgments can play a significant role 
in clarifying states’ obligations that flow from the right to health, and encourage a 
greater degree of democratic deliberation relating to the normative values reflected 
in diverse countries’ health systems.  
III.  PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS :  DEFINING THE CONTOURS OF 
THE JUSTICIABLE RIGHT 
Health rights cases brought before the ESC Rights Committee will 
predominantly be brought under the right to health articulated in Article 12 of the 
ICESCR, which recognizes the right of everyone to the enjoyment of “the highest 
attainable standard of physical and mental health.”15 Paragraph 2 of Article 12 
states the four steps that States parties shall take to progressively realize the right, 
in accordance with maximum available resources:  
(a) The provision for the reduction of the stillbirth-rate and of infant mortality 
and for the healthy development of the child; (b) The improvement of all 
aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene; (c) The prevention, 
treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational and other diseases; 
(d) The creation of conditions which would assure to all medical service and 
medical attention in the event of sickness.16  
The ESC Rights Committee has subsequently interpreted these provisions 
in its General Comment 14.  
It is clear from General Comment 14 that the right to health includes both 
freedoms and entitlements. The freedoms include the right to control one’s health 
and body, including sexual and reproductive freedom, and the right to be free 
from interference, such as the right to be free from torture, non-consensual 
medical treatment and experimentation. By contrast, the entitlements include the 
                                                 
13  See Lynn P. Freedman, Achieving the MDGs: Health Systems as Core Social Institutions, 48 DEV. 19 (2005); 
Alicia Ely Yamin & Ole Frithjof Norheim, Taking Equality Seriously: Applying Human Rights 
Frameworks to Priority Setting in Health, 36 HUM. RTS. Q. 296 (2014). 
14  Soobramoney v. Minister of Health (KwaZulu-Natal) 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) ¶ 54 (S.Afr.) (Sachs, 
A., concurring). 
15  International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 12(1), Dec. 16, 1966, 993 
U.N.T.S. 3. 
16  Id. art 12(2). 
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right to a system of health protection which provides equality of opportunity for 
people to enjoy the highest attainable level of health.17  
Governmental obligations with respect to health include respecting the right 
and refraining from direct contravention; protecting the right from interference 
by third parties, including through regulation and sanctioning of private actors 
(such as pharmaceutical companies, polluters, or domestic abusers); and fulfilling 
the right through appropriate legislative and other measures directed at its 
progressive realization, in accordance with maximum available resources.18 
At national levels, the right to health has often been construed as the right 
to medical care, as in Camila’s case and in the overwhelming majority of the over 
one million tutela (protection writ) cases that have been brought in Colombia since 
1999.19 However, the right to health under the ICESCR includes the underlying 
determinants of health as well.20 These underlying determinants, including such 
public health measures as water and sanitation, and the even broader social 
determinants of health—which go to the rights upon which health is 
interdependent, including freedom of information, housing and education—are 
responsible for a far greater share of the patterns of health and illness than access 
to medical care. The WHO Commission on the Social Determinants of Health 
explains that “lack of health care is not the cause of the huge global burden of 
illness . . . The main action . . . must therefore come from outside the health 
sector.”21 Thus, while there is obviously no right to be healthy under international 
law, there is also a recognition that the right to health includes public health 
preconditions, and that it is inextricably related to other rights. 
Other TMBs, such as the CEDAW Committee and CRC Committee, have 
also interpreted important dimensions of health-related rights for women and 
children, respectively.22 These TMBs have also consistently noted that the equal 
                                                 
17  Comm’n on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights [CESCR], General Comment No. 14: The Right to the 
Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Article 12 of the Covenant), ¶ 8, 22nd Sess., U.N. Doc. 
E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000)[hereinafter CESCR, General Comment No. 14]. 
18  Id. at ¶¶ 33, 35–37. 
19  JORGE ARMANDO OTÁLORA, DEFENSORÍA DEL PUEBLO, LA TUTELA Y LOS DERECHOS A LA SALUD Y 
LA SEGURIDAD SOCIAL 2013 (2014). 
20  See CESCR, General Comment No. 14, supra note 17, at ¶¶ 9, 11. 
21  World Health Organization [WHO] Comm’n on Soc. Determinants of Health, Closing the Gap in a 
Generation: Health Equity Through Action on the Social Determinants of Health: Final Report of the Commission 
on Social Determinants of Health 35 (2008). 
22  See Comm’n on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women [CEDAW], CEDAW General 
Recommendation No. 24: Article 12 of the Convention (Women and Health), ¶ 1, 20th Sess., U.N. 
Doc. A/54/38/Rev.1, chap. I (Apr. 20, 1999) (affirming that “access to health care . . . is a basic 
right under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women); 
Comm’n on the Rights of the Child [CRC], General Comment No. 15 on the Right of the Child to 
the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (art. 24), ¶ 1, 62nd Sess., U.N. Doc. 
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and effective enjoyment of the right to health relates to other social determinants 
in society. For example, the CEDAW Committee recognized that “there are 
societal factors which are determinative of the health status of women and men 
….” such as nutrition, education, and adequate living conditions.23 The CEDAW 
Committee also recognized the power imbalances between women and men that 
affect access to information and increased exposure to violence and abuse.24 
Given the implications for both the normative definition and legitimacy of the 
treatment of rights by supra-national tribunals, through both their jurisprudence 
and their selection of cases, it will be critical for the ESC Rights Committee, as 
well as other bodies, to underscore the importance of construing the right to 
health in this broader view, stressing prevention as well as the inter-connectedness 
of health with other rights. 
 At the same time,  
it is important to guard against an approach whereby the right to health is 
conceived of as a repository for everything that impacts upon the health of 
an individual . . . the right to health should not be inflated to such an extent 
that the rights relevant to these matters are subsumed within the right to 
health and denied their lex specialis status and capacity for a content which 
exists independently of the right to health.25 
The right to health should not be utilized as a catch-all approach to realizing 
other social rights; health is not the only important input in a life of dignity. When 
domestic courts begin enforcing access to disposable diapers, live-in caretakers, 
and the like as part of “integral treatment” under the right to health, as has 
occurred in Colombia26 and Brazil,27 they may not be doing a service to the cause 
of social inclusion and equity in the long run. Under this approach, funds may be 
taken from health baskets, potentially distorting priority-setting in health, while 
political pressure to devise universal policies regarding social protection that 
afford a minimum vital standard and life of dignity may at the same time be 
displaced.  
                                                 
CRC/C/GC/15 (Apr. 17, 2013) (urging state parties to “respect[], protect[], and fulfill[] children’s 
right to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health); CRC, General Comment No. 
3: HIV/AIDS and the Rights of the Child, ¶ 5, 32nd Sess., UN Doc. CRC/GC/2003/3 (Mar. 17, 
2003) (stating that children’s enumerated rights should be “guiding themes in the consideration of 
HIV/AIDS at all levels of prevention, treatment, care and support”). 
23  CEDAW General Recommendation No. 24, supra note 22, at ¶ 6. 
24  Id. at ¶ 12(b). 
25  JOHN TOBIN, THE RIGHT TO HEALTH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 132 (2012). 
26  See RODRIGO UPRIMNY & JUANITA DURÁN, EQUIDAD Y PROTECCIÓN JUDICIAL DEL DERECHO A LA 
SALUD EN COLOMBIA (Santiago de Chile: Naciones Unidas, 2014).  
27  See Daniel W. Liang Wang & Octavio Luiz Motta Ferraz, Reaching out to the Needy?, Access to Justice 
and Public Attorneys’ Role in the Right to Health Litigation in the City of São Paulo, 10 SUR INT’L J. HUM. 
RTS. 159 (2013). 
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The interdependence of health and other rights is also important to recall in 
adjudications interpreting treaties in which the right to health is not explicitly 
guaranteed. The Human Rights Committee (HRC), the treaty monitoring body 
for the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,28 has recognized that 
the protection of the right to life under the ICCPR requires states not just to 
refrain from arbitrary deprivation or interference with the right to life, but also to 
adopt positive measures to ensure access to basic health care and other ESC rights. 
For example, international legal scholar Rebecca Cook has noted that the HRC’s 
concluding observations indicate that “persistently high levels of maternal 
mortality put states on notice that they may be in breach of their obligations to 
take effective measures to protect women’s right to life.”29 Thus, there is a 
recognized indivisibility of rights denominated as civil and political—for example, 
the right to life— and those denominated as economic and social, including the 
right to health. 
With respect to the American Convention on Human Rights30 (American 
Convention), Judge Eduardo Ferrer Mac-Gregor Poisot of the IACtHR explains 
the implications for judicial interpretation of an approach that takes seriously 
interdependence and indivisibility. In his influential concurring opinion in Suárez 
Peralta v. Ecuador, he writes that capturing interdependence and indivisibility makes 
“it obligatory to interpret all rights together—which at times, results in 
overlapping contents—and to assess the implications of the respect, protection 
and guarantee of some rights for other rights, as regards their effective 
implementation.”31  
Indeed, the effective enjoyment of health rights, whether explicitly enshrined 
in the governing international treaty or not, often depends upon enabling rights, 
including freedom of expression and information. For example, the ECtHR found 
a violation of the right to freedom of expression and information (Article 10 of 
the European Convention of Human Rights32) when the government of Ireland 
banned the provision of information to pregnant women seeking to go abroad to 
obtain an abortion.33 The ECtHR held that “the national authorities enjoy a wide 
margin of appreciation in matters of morals” but that this is not unlimited.34 The 
                                                 
28  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [ICCPR], Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
29  Rebecca J. Cook, Human Rights Law and Safe Motherhood, 5 EUR. J. HEALTH L. 357, 361 (1998).  
30  American Convention on Human Rights, “Pact of San José, Costa Rica”, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 
U.N.T.S. 123. 
31  Suárez Peralta v. Ecuador, supra note 11, at 10. 
32 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 
U.N.T.S. 221. 
33  Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland, 246 Eur. Ct. H.R. 68 (Ser. A) (1992). 
34  Id. at ¶ 68. 
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ECtHR noted that when the state takes measures, it “must do so in a manner 
which is compatible with [its] obligations” under the European Convention, and 
Article 10 only permits those restrictions on freedom of expression that are 
necessary in a democratic society.35 The ECtHR concluded “that the restraint 
imposed on the applicants from receiving or imparting information was 
disproportionate to the aims pursued.”36 
In short, adjudication of health-related cases by the ESC Rights Committee, 
as well as other supra-national tribunals, has the potential to highlight the 
underlying public health preconditions of health, which are part of the right to 
health in addition to medical care. Further, such judgments afford the opportunity 
to clarify that the right to health itself does not subsume all other rights necessary 
for a life of dignity, but is interdependent with them. In so doing, such judgments 
provide an equally important opportunity for creating substantial public 
learning—at both national and global levels—about the imperative for policy-
makers to think in terms of multi-sectorial planning, and for “circles of 
accountability” throughout health policy cycles, rather than appending remedies 
to broken health systems.37 
IV.  SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF HEALTH TO CONSIDER IN 
APPROACHES TO INTERIM/  PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES  
Much health rights litigation, as in the case of Camila at the opening of this 
article, will involve irreparable injury or death to the petitioner if the TMB fails to 
intervene immediately. As Manuel Jose Cepeda, former justice and President of 
the Colombian Constitutional Court, has aptly noted, “the passage of time has an 
ethical dimension.”38 The circumstances under which TMBs utilize interim (or 
precautionary) measures39 to prevent further alleged harm to the petitioner, and 
the types of measures they use, will not only have direct effects upon the 
petitioner, but will also likely have indirect effects on others—as well as on the 
legitimacy of the supra-national body itself.  
                                                 
35  Id. at ¶ 69. 
36  Id. at ¶ 80. 
37  See Alicia Ely Yamin & Fiona Lander, Implementing a Circle of Accountability: A Proposed Framework for 
Judiciaries and Other Actors in Enforcing Health-Related Rights, 14 J. HUM. RTS. 312 (2015); ALICIA ELY 
YAMIN, POWER, SUFFERING, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR DIGNITY: HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORKS 
FOR HEALTH AND WHY THEY MATTER (2016). 
38  Manuel José Cepeda, Professor and Former Chief Justice of the Colombian Supreme Court, 
Presentation for the Harvard FXB Center, Health Rights Litigation Course at the Global School on 
Socio-Economic Rights (Sept., 2013). 
39  Interim measures are also referred to as “precautionary measures” or “provisional measures” in 
some jurisdictions. 
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Under the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR, the ESC Rights Committee 
may issue interim measures only “as may be necessary in exceptional 
circumstances.”40 Therefore, the ESC Rights Committee has discretion in 
determining what amounts to exceptional circumstances and will likely set that 
precedent at the outset of its jurisprudence. Indeed, many are waiting to see how 
the ESC Rights Committee will use this authority.41 Other international human 
rights tribunals, such as the HRC and Committee Against Torture do not have the 
burden of determining whether a case has an exceptional nature when deciding 
whether to issue interim measures.42 In civil and political rights cases, 
precautionary and interim measures have most often been used to prevent the 
state from engaging in further harmful action. However, precautionary measures 
have also been used to compel positive state action related to health (for example 
the provision of emergency medical care, food or water). We argue here that it is 
possible to elaborate criteria in order to establish a principled approach to interim 
measures.  
Across national jurisdictions, courts have been asked to override denials of 
medical care and treatment to individuals, which more often than not fall within 
the health scheme (i.e., “quality-skimping” as opposed to judicial activism) and 
sometimes do not—but are nevertheless alleged to be protected as a matter of 
fundamental rights.43 This is likely to occur with increasing frequency in the era of 
the Sustainable Development Goals, as schemes to achieve universal health 
coverage are adopted, which may not always be well aligned with constitutional 
principles, or international normative commitments.44  
An important preliminary distinction in such cases, which will arise in the 
issuance of interim measures, is that between “life-saving” and “emergency” care, 
the latter of which is sometimes guaranteed without reference to progressive 
realization in national law. For example, in the 1997 South African case of 
                                                 
40  Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. 
Res. 63/117, art. 5(1), U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/117 (Dec. 10, 2008) [hereinafter Optional Protocol 
to ESC Rights Committee]. 
41  See, for example, Malcolm Langford, et al., ESCR-Net Draft Background Note, Supporting Strategic 
Litigation under the Optional Protocol to ICESCR Rights Committee, 8 (Aug. 30, 2010), http://www.escr-
net.org/sites/default/files/OP_SLI_Background_Note_FINAL_0_0.pdf. 
42  See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N. Doc 
A/RES/21/2200 (Dec. 16, 1966); Resolution, Convention Against Torture, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/39/46 (Dec. 10, 1984). 
43  See Litigating Health Rights: Can Courts Bring More Justice to Health?, supra note 9; Courting Social 
Justice: Judicial Enforcement of Social and Economic Rights in the Developing World, supra note 
9. 
44  See U.N. General Assembly, Transforming Our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development, U.N. Doc. A/RES/70/1 (Sept. 25, 2015). 
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Soobramoney,45 petitioner sought state-funded dialysis treatment for his incurable 
chronic renal failure after exhausting his personal funds in private care. The state-
funded treatment center denied dialysis treatment on the basis that he did not 
meet the eligibility criteria for the treatment, namely because his diagnosis was 
chronic and he suffered an array of associated conditions.46 Further, the state of 
KwaZulu Natal argued that to expand treatment criteria would exhaust its 
budget.47 In that case, the South African Constitutional Court found that chronic 
kidney failure was not an “emergency condition”, and therefore not subject to 
Section 27(3) of the Constitution, which would have required immediate 
protection.48 The Court found that the state’s policy and budgetary claims were 
reasonable,49 and Mr. Soobramoney died shortly thereafter. If the ICESCR’s 
Optional Protocol had been in effect and South Africa had been a party to it, such 
a case could have been filed before the ESC Rights Committee for interim 
measures seeking to compel the state to provide immediate treatment.  
While the deferential standard of scrutiny of the budgetary claims has been 
justifiably criticized in the Soobramoney case, we believe that the distinction between 
emergency care and chronic care is an important one to consider in terms of 
defining the “exceptional circumstances” under which the ESC Rights Committee 
should order interim measures. Evidence from national contexts suggests that 
when individuals seek the equivalent of interim measures from courts to provide 
immediate entitlements to life-saving or life-prolonging care, including treatment 
abroad as happened in Camila’s case, it can potentially distort health policy-
making and priorities within health systems. That can, in turn, exacerbate 
inequities.50 While granting true “emergency care” to individuals through interim 
measures potentially has some of the same adverse consequences, and calls for 
carefully defining the contours of what constitutes an “emergency,” its scope will 
likely be far more limited. Moreover, the lack of effective access to “emergency 
care,” as defined under most jurisdictions51—including trauma care and attention 
                                                 
45  Soobramoney v. Minister of Health (KwaZulu-Natal), supra note 14. 
46  Id. at ¶ 1–4. 
47  Id. at ¶ 2–3. 
48  Id. at ¶ 19–21. 
49  Id. at ¶ 29. 
50  See Octavio Ferraz, The Right to Health in the Courts of Brazil: Worsening Health Inequities?, 11 HEALTH 
& HUM. RTS J. 33 (2009); Coleen M. Flood & Aeyal Gross, Litigating the Right to Health: What Can We 
Learn from a Comparative Law and Health Care Systems Approach, 16 HEALTH & HUM. RTS J. 62 (2014); 
Yamin & Lander, supra note 37. 
51  See, for example, Soobramoney v. Minister of Health (KwaZulu-Natal), supra note 14, at ¶ 20 (stating 
that “Section 27(3) itself is couched in negative terms—it is a right not to be refused emergency 
treatment. The purpose of the right seems to be to ensure that treatment be given in an emergency, 
and is not frustrated by reason of bureaucratic requirements or other formalities . . . What the 
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to active labor—almost always reveals structural violations of the right to health 
or systematic discrimination, including on the basis of cost, within a health system, 
which are often worthy of being brought to light.  
Examining the experience of other supra-national tribunals, and in particular 
the Inter-American system, provides additional guidance for what may be 
appropriate to consider as “exceptional circumstances.” First, the Inter-American 
Commission (IACHR) frequently uses precautionary measures and the Inter-
American Court (IACtHR) uses provisional measures; both have done so regularly 
for health-related cases in custodial situations, where the responsibilities of the 
state are appropriately heightened and the cases reflect institutional failures with 
effects on health-related rights. The Inter-American Commission has ordered 
precautionary measures for cases where hospital and prison conditions have been 
deplorable, requiring the state to provide medical care and to implement medical 
and sanitation measures to protect the personal integrity and dignity of patients 
and inmates. For example, in the case of “460 patients living in a Neuropsychiatric 
Hospital in Paraguay,” the Inter-American Commission “requested that, given the 
grave health risks presented, the state urgently adopt the sanitary and medical 
measures necessary to avoid harm to the personal integrity of the patients of the 
hospital.”52 The IACHR has issued precautionary measures on behalf of prison 
inmates to compel state provision of medical examinations,53 proper medical 
                                                 
section requires is that remedial treatment that is necessary and available be given immediately to 
avert that harm.”); Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act [EMTALA], 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1395dd(e)(1)(A)(i) (2012) (“A medical condition manifesting itself by acute symptoms of 
sufficient severity (including severe pain) such that the absence of immediate medical attention 
could reasonably be expected to result in . . . placing the health of the individual . . . in serious 
jeopardy.”). 
52  Tara J. Melish, Rethinking The ‘Less as More’ Thesis: Supranational Litigation of Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights in the Americas, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 171, 284–85 (2006) (citing 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.118, doc. 5 rev. 2 (2003), ch. III.C.1, ¶ 60 (Paraguay)). 
53  Ananías Laparra Martínez v. Mexico, Provisional Measure, Inter-Am. C.H.R., 351/11, (Jan. 18, 
2012); Egberto Ángel Escobedo Morales v. Cuba, Provisional Measure, Inter-Am. C.H.R., 179/10 
(June 28, 2010); Alberto Patishtán Gómez v. Mexico, Provisional Measure, Inter-Am. C.H.R., 
77/12 (May 24, 2012); Niurka Luque Alvarez v. Cuba, Provisional Measure, Inter-Am. C.H.R., 
153/2012 (May 16, 2012); Luis Álvarez Renta v. Dominican Rep., Provisional Measure, Inter-Am. 
C.H.R., 393/10 (Dec. 15, 2011). 
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treatment,54 and to improve conditions, as has the IACtHR for proper medical 
treatment55 and to improve conditions.56  
Second, supra-national tribunals also issue interim measures for larger 
structural issues that impact health outcomes of defined populations. For 
example, both the Inter-American Court and Commission have issued provisional 
and precautionary measures, respectively, requiring a state party to establish or 
complete health programs for marginalized or disadvantaged populations, such as 
specific indigenous groups, affected by egregious pollution or other actions of the 
respondent.57 In 300 Inhabitants of Puerto Nuevo, Peru,58 the Inter-American 
Commission required Peru to suspend warehouse and transport activities in a port 
because of the environmental contamination and health consequences for the 
population living nearby. In addition to suspending activities until a measure could 
be issued to address the issue, the Inter-American Commission also required the 
state “to adopt the necessary measures to provide specialized medical diagnostic 
services for the beneficiaries as well as appropriate and specialized medical 
treatment” when there appeared to be an irreparable risk of injury to bodily 
integrity or life itself.59 
Third, the Inter-American Commission has also issued precautionary 
measures to compel the provision of specific medical care to stigmatized 
populations whose treatment in the health system reflects and reinforces societal 
discrimination, such as persons living with HIV/AIDS. In some cases, the Inter-
American Commission has specified that treatment should “include 
                                                 
54  Esquina Mendoza v. Guatemala, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.102, Ch. III, ¶ 24 (1998); 
People Deprived of Their Freedom at Professor Aníbal Bruno Prison, Inter-Am. C.H.R., PM 
199/11, Braz. (2011); Egberto Ángel Escobedo Morales v. Cuba, supra note 53; 31 Undocumented 
Immigrants Residing in Atlanta, Ga. v. U.S, Provisional Measure, Inter-Am. C.H.R., 385/09, (Jan. 
29, 2010).  
55  Cesti-Hurtado v. Peru, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. E) No. 56 (Sept. 29, 1999). 
56  Las Penitenciarías De Mendoza, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. E) (Nov. 22, 2004). 
57  See Communities of the Maya People (Sipakepense and Mam) of the Sipacapa and San Miguel 
Ixtahuacán Municipalities in the Department of San Marcos v. Guatemala, Provisional Measure, 
Inter-Am. C.H.R., 260/07 (May 20, 2010) (The Inter-American Commission asked the State “to 
address the health problems that are the subject of these precautionary measures, in particular to 
begin a health assistance and health care program for the beneficiaries aimed at identifying those 
who may have been affected by the consequences of the contamination, so as to provide them with 
appropriate medical attention.”); Indigenous Communities of the Xingu River Basin v. Paráguay & 
Brazil, Inter-Am. C.H.R., 382/10 (Apr. 1, 2011) (The Inter-American Commission issued 
precautionary measures in a case concerning dam construction, requiring the state to adopt measure 
to protect the health of communities living close to the construction and communities affected by 
the project, including the implementation of previously issued health programs.). 
58  300 Inhabitants of Puerto Nuevo v. Peru, Provisional Measure, Inter-Am. C.H.R., 199/09 (Dec. 
27, 2010). 
59  Id. 
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comprehensive treatment and the antiretroviral medications necessary to prevent 
death, as well as the necessary hospital, pharmacological, and nutritional care 
needed to strengthen their immunological systems and prevent the development 
of infections.”60 For example, in the case of Jorge Odir Miranda Cortez y Otros (El 
Salvador),61 the Commission recommended precautionary measures consisting of 
the provision of triple therapy as well as necessary hospital, pharmaceutical and 
nutritional care for the petitioner and 26 others suffering from HIV/AIDS.62  
Fourth, the Inter-American Commission and Court have also issued 
precautionary and provisional measures, respectively, against a state refusing to 
provide abortion services to women whose lives are at risk.63 The IACtHR has 
held that it has the authority to issue provisional measures to protect human rights 
even when there is no contentious case filed in the Court and when it prima facie 
will result in irreparable damage to the individual and severe impairment of human 
rights.64 Under Article 63 of the American Convention, the Court must examine 
whether the three elements are met prior to issuing a precautionary measure. The 
three elements are: (1) gravity of the case, (2) urgency and (3) irreparable harm to 
the plaintiff.65 In the case of B v. El Salvador, the plaintiff, seeking an abortion, 
suffered from multiple health issues, her fetus was anencephalic, and her 
pregnancy posed a high risk of death to the mother. The probable death of the 
                                                 
60  Melish, supra note 52, at 283–84. 
61  Jorge Odir Miranda Cortez et al. v. El Salvador, Provisional Measure, Inter-Am. C.H.R., (Feb. 29, 
2000). 
62 Id. See also Juan Pablo Améstica Cáceres et al. v. Chile, Provisional Measure Inter-Am. Comm’n 
H.R., (Nov. 20, 2001); 52 Persons, Including Two Minors, Who Are Carriers of the Human 
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV/AIDS) v. Bolivia, Provisional Measure, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R. 
(Oct. 3, 2002); Ten carriers of HIV/AIDS v. Dominican Republic, Provisional Measure, Inter-Am. 
Comm’n H.R. (Aug. 14, 2002); Six Ecuadorian Citizens who Claimed to be HIV/AIDS Carriers v. 
Ecuador, Provisional Measure, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R. (July 9, 2002); Eight Carriers of the 
HIV/AIDS Virus v. Nicaragua, Provisional Measure, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R. (July 29, 2002); 11 
Carriers of HIV/AIDS v. Guatemala, Provisional Measure, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R. (Aug. 16, 
2002); Four Carriers of the HIV/AIDS Virus v. Honduras, Provisional Measure, Inter-Am. 
Comm’n H.R. (Aug. 16, 2002); 15 Carriers of the HIV/AIDS Virus v. Peru, Provisional Measure, 
Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R. (Sept. 23, 2002). 
63  See In re B, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., 114/13 El Sal. (Apr. 29, 2013) (where the Inter-American 
Commission ordered a precautionary measure of abortion where the risk of death to the mother 
was high. The Commission then requested provisional measures to the Inter-American Court which 
were issued in Matter of B., Inter-Amer. Ct. H.R. (ser. E) (May 29, 2013)); Mainumby, Paraguay, 
Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., 178/15 (2015) (where the Court ordered that the state provide access to 
adequate medical treatment for a 10 year old girl impregnated by rape).  
64  In re B., supra note 63, at 5 (“this Court has established in previous cases that, ‘owing to the 
protective nature of provisional measures, exceptionally, these may be ordered, even when there is 
no contentious case before the inter-American system, in situations that, prima facie, may result in 
a grave and imminent impairment of human rights’”) (quoting prior case law). 
65  American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 30, art. 63.  
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mother if no action were taken, and the urgency of the mother’s medical condition 
as the pregnancy continued, balanced against the certain death of the fetus, 
satisfied Article 63, and the Court issued a provisional measure.66 Specifically, the 
IACtHR ordered El Salvador, which has a total ban on abortion, to allow the 
treating physicians to take any medical measures considered timely and 
appropriate to ensure the protection of Mrs. B’s right to life and personal integrity 
and health.67  
Similarly, in 2015, the Inter-American Commission issued precautionary 
measures in the case of Asunto Nina Mainumby Respecto de Paraguay, on behalf of a 
10 year-old girl who had been impregnated through rape by her step-father.68 
Under Paraguayan law, abortion is legal when the life of the mother is at risk, but 
authorities had claimed that the pregnancy would be medically supervised so that 
her life would not be in grave risk. The Inter-American Commission analyzed the 
three elements required to issue a precautionary measure, as well as WHO 
technical guidelines regarding abortion. It ordered that the girl have access to 
adequate medical treatment, and to ensure that her best interests as a child were 
represented in all health decisions affecting her.69 Despite the IACHR 
precautionary measures, requests from the mother, and international pressure, the 
government refused to administer an abortion.70 The 11-year-old girl gave birth 
by caesarean section in August 2015.71 
We argue these are examples of cases that meet the threshold of “exceptional 
circumstances.” Failure to provide effective access to therapeutic abortion, even 
when legal, has been repeatedly found to be inconsistent with fundamental 
                                                 
66  In re B., supra note 63, at 11–12. 
67  Id. 
68  Mainumby, supra note 63, at ¶ 23(a), (b). 
69  Id. (where the Court ordered that the state provide a requested abortion for a 10 year old girl holding 
that “the State of Paraguay to protect the life and personal integrity of the child, to ensure that she 
has access to adequate medical treatment for her situation and the treatment recommended by the 
specialists, in light of the technical guidelines of the World Health Organization and other similar 
sources applicable to the sexual and reproductive health of girls and adolescents, in which all the 
options available are assured; to ensure that the rights of the child are duly represented and 
guaranteed in all health decisions affecting the child, including the right of the child to be informed 
and participate in decisions affecting her health in accordance with her age and maturity; and take 
all necessary measures so that the girl has all of the technical and family support necessary to 
comprehensively protect her rights” [translation]). 
70  See Irma Oviedo & Jonathan Watts, Pregnant 10-year-old Rape Victim Denied Abortion by Paraguayan 
Authorities, THE GUARDIAN (May 4, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/ 
04/paraguay-pregnant-10-year-old-abortion.  
71  Laurence Blair, Paraguayan 11-year-old Gives Birth After Pregnancy Sparked Abortion Debate, THE 
GUARDIAN (Aug. 13 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/13/paraguay-11-year-
old-gives-birth-abortion?CMP=share_btn_link. 
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obligations under international law.72 It also reflects systematic discrimination 
against women, because it is a denial of a life-saving service that only women and 
girls require; and also because abortion (including therapeutic abortion) can often 
be shown to be impervious to democratic “fair-minded” deliberation due to 
ideological or religious factors capturing the legislative process and impeding the 
implementation of medical protocols.  
Reviewing the definition of the right to health and the use of precautionary 
measures by other supra-national tribunals, we propose that these examples are 
illustrative of the sorts of exceptional circumstances that the ESC Rights 
Committee should consider. That is, in health rights litigation, interim measures 
should not be granted solely because an individual petitioner may face imminent 
and irreparable harm. Utilizing precautionary measures for individual petitions 
may inadvertently distort incentives within systems by allowing the individual to 
jump queues or to access care or treatment previously denied by the state based 
upon legitimate, socially-deliberated policies.73 The suffering of identified 
petitioners must be balanced against the suffering of anonymous patients, and 
other valid considerations in balancing rights.74 Therefore, as we have suggested 
based on practice of other supra-national tribunals, additional criteria to be 
considered might include: (1) systemic oversight failures in custodial institutions 
that will cause imminent and irreparable harm, as in the cases of prisons, hospitals, 
psychiatric institutions and other custodial settings; (2) prevention of imminent 
and irreparable harm to a defined population due to discrimination or abuse 
within the health system, as in discrimination against sexual minorities or people 
living with HIV; (3) prevention of imminent and irreparable harm due to policies 
or activities beyond the health system that have an impact on the health of a 
defined population directly, such as pollution, dams, etc.; or (4) evidence of prima 
facie failures of democratic deliberation with regard to setting priorities and 
                                                 
72  CEDAW, Communication No. 22/2009, Views Adopted by the Committee at its Fiftieth Session, 
3 to 21 October 2011, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/50/D/22/2009 (Nov. 25, 2011)[hereinafter 
CEDAW, L.C. v. Peru](known as L.C. v. Peru); HRC, Communication No. 1153/2003, Views Of 
The Human Rights Committee Under Article 5, Paragraph 4, Of The Optional Protocol To The 
International Covenant On Civil And Political Rights, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/85/D/1153/2003 
(Nov. 22, 2005) [hereinafter HRC, K.L. v. Peru](known as K.L. v. Peru). See also HRC, 
Communication No. 1608/2007, Views of the Human Rights Committee under Article 5, 
Paragraph 4, of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/101/D/1608/2007 (Apr. 28, 2011) (known as L.M.R. v. Argentina); 
Execution of the Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights, A, B and C against Ireland 
(Dec. 4, 2014)[hereinafter Council of Europe, Execution of the Judgment of the European Court 
of Human Rights, A, B and C against Ireland]. 
73  See IDENTIFIED VERSUS STATISTICAL LIVES: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVE 3 (I. Glenn 
Cohen, et al. eds., 2015) (stating that, with respect to government actions that privilege one citizen 
over another, “[a] genuine question exists as to whether we should give some priority to identified 
persons over statistical ones”). 
74  See generally id.  
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guaranteeing access to health services on the basis of non-discrimination, such 
that there is a significant risk of imminent and irreparable harm, as in the cases of 
abortion mentioned above.  
V.  SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF HEALTH TO CONSIDER IN 
APPROACHES TO TREATMENT OF EVIDENCE 
As illustrated by Camila’s case, health litigation often requires supra-national 
tribunals to weigh highly technical information. These cases can present unique 
challenges to evidence production and evidentiary burdens because of the 
technical nature of the evidence and the systemic nature of health care delivery. 
For example, data regarding both clinical and cost-effectiveness, epidemiological 
evidence, and budgetary and resource allocation information is relevant to the 
consideration of normative issues relating to the state’s obligations. The ESC 
Rights Committee will need to determine what evidence or information it will 
accept under the Optional Protocol, and from which parties. These decisions will 
in turn be crucial to the ability of the TMB to effectively adjudicate complex 
health-rights related litigation. We argue here that the ESC Rights Committee and 
other supra-national tribunals that hear health rights cases should take full 
advantage of evidentiary production procedures to include the ability to call for 
independent experts, as well as to receive amicus briefs that permit the 
adjudicating body to consider different interpretations of the disputed norms.75  
A.  Third Party Interveners to Address Knowledge Gaps  
Litigation on whether the state, as a matter of reasonableness, is obligated to 
provide access to a certain medicine in its health scheme may require inquiry into 
the pharmacological composition of the medicine, analysis of studies testing its 
efficacy, and its utility to treat certain conditions.76 Health care treatment 
procedures and standards of care are based upon extensive studies and testing, 
requiring knowledge of both epidemiological, clinical, and public health data. This 
focus on evidence-based medicine requires complex, nuanced knowledge with 
respect to kinds of information not generally within the purview of adjudicators 
hearing health rights cases.  
                                                 
75  See Bruce Porter, The Reasonableness of Article 8(4) – Adjudicating Claims from the Margins, 27 NORDISK 
TIDSSKRIFT FOR MENNESKERETTIGHETER 39, 53 (2009) (arguing that in such cases, the ESC Rights 
Committee should “hear the evidence of rights claimants, access independent experts, or hear from 
NGO interveners”). 
76  See Ole Frithjof Norheim & Bruce M. Wilson, Health Rights Litigation and Access to Medicines: 
Priority Classification of Successful Cases from Costa Rica's Constitutional Chamber of the 
Supreme Court, 16 HEALTH & HUM. RTS. J. 47 (2014). 
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Further, the mere presentation of statistical evidence and data may not be 
sufficient, as the interpretation of data itself is complex. Without some technical 
assistance adjudicators may misconstrue what statistics indicate, what sorts of 
confidence intervals they entail, and what sorts of “uncertainty absorption” are 
involved in their collection.77 Similarly, the organization and functioning of health 
systems may lie beyond the normal expertise of international lawyers, and yet 
without understanding how health systems function in general and in specific 
contexts, sentences and recommendations may not be easily translated into 
regulations and effective enjoyment of rights in practice. For example, skilled birth 
attendance rates may be close to meaningless, and increases in some forms of 
mortality may be due to improved surveillance rather than worsening situations.78 
Thus, expert testimony may be necessary to enable the accurate interpretation of 
data and to translate what truths the numbers represent. In general, establishing 
flexible procedures to allow the treaty body to hear expert testimony on technical 
health issues, or permitting petitioners to produce their own expert witnesses, will 
be essential to ameliorate the inevitable knowledge gap in highly technical health 
rights cases. 
Regional TMBs have incorporated various rules to give themselves the 
opportunity to acquire technical knowledge to inform their decisions, which 
provide valuable models for making the ESC Rights Committee’s examinations 
of communications under Article 8 of the Optional Protocol effective. For 
example, the ECtHR is obligated to receive evidence according to the laws of each 
country. The ECtHR may seek additional evidence at its discretion.79 This includes 
                                                 
77  See JAMES MARCH & HERBERT SIMON, ORGANIZATIONS 186 (1993) (uncertainty absorption “takes 
place when inferences are drawn from a body of evidence and the inferences, instead of the 
evidence itself, are then communicated”). 
78  Mitike Molla, et al., Impacts of Maternal Mortality on Living Children and Families: A Qualitative Study from 
Butajira, Ethiopia, 12 REPROD. HEALTH S6 (2015); see also Corrina Moucheraud et al., Consequences of 
Maternal Mortality on Infant and Child Survival: A 25-Year Longitudinal Analysis in Butajira, Ethiopia 
(1987–2011), 12 REPROD. HEALTH S4 (2015); Lucia Knight & Alicia Yamin, “Without a Mother”: 
Caregivers and Community Members’ Views about the Impacts of Maternal Mortality on Families in KwaZulu-
Natal, South Africa, 12 REPROD. HEALTH S5 (2015); Brian Houle et al., The Impacts of Maternal Mortality 
and Cause of Death on Children’s Risk of Dying in Rural South Africa: Evidence From a Population-based 
Surveillance Study (1992–2013), 12 REPROD. HEALTH S7 (2015); Junior Bazile et al., Intergenerational 
Impacts of Maternal Mortality: Qualitative Findings from Rural Malawi, 12 REPROD. HEALTH S1 (2015); 
Alicia Ely Yamin & Vanessa M. Boulanger, Why Global Goals and Indicators Matter: The Experience of 
Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights in the Millennium Development Goals, 15 J. HUM. DEV. & 
CAPABILITIES 218 (2014). 
79  ECHR, Rules of the Court 49 (June 1, 2014) (The annex to the Rules of the Court states in rule A1: 
“1. The Chamber may, at the request of a party or of its own motion, adopt any investigative 
measure which it considers capable of clarifying the facts of the case. The Chamber may, inter alia, 
invite the parties to produce documentary evidence and decide to hear as a witness or expert or in 
any other capacity any person whose evidence or statements seem likely to assist it in carrying out 
its tasks. 2. The Chamber may also ask any person or institution of its choice to express an opinion 
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invitations to any person or institution to provide testimony or written reports, or 
provides the option for the TMB to appoint an adjudicator, with or without the 
assistance of an expert, to conduct its own investigation.80 Although this function 
has not been utilized frequently in cases that concern health-related rights, the 
Court has “frequent recourse to the fact-finding capabilities of other Council of 
Europe bodies”81 and also uses reports from third parties or national or 
international organizations, either in reference to existing reports or requests from 
the Court to produce expert opinions. For example, the Court has noted that it:  
has consistently held that it takes into account relevant international 
instruments and reports in order to interpret the guarantees of the 
Convention and to establish whether there is a common standard in the field 
concerned. It is for the Court to decide which international instruments and 
reports it considers relevant and how much weight to attribute to them.82  
For instance, in the case of Kiyutin v. Russia, a third party intervener submitted 
evidence concerning the consensus among international experts that travel 
restrictions against persons with HIV were not justified. The Court wrote that: 
[i]n the present case, the Court considers undoubtedly relevant the third 
party’s submission on the existing consensus among experts and international 
organisations active in the field of public health who agreed that travel 
restrictions on people living with HIV could not be justified by reference to 
public-health concerns … The respondent Government, for their part, did 
not adduce any expert opinions or scientific analysis that would be capable of 
gainsaying the unanimous view of the international experts.83  
Similarly, the CEDAW Committee permits the submission of amicus briefs 
through its individual complaint mechanism and has received several submissions 
for health rights cases.84 For example, in the Alyne da Silva case, the CEDAW 
                                                 
or make a written report on any matter considered by it to be relevant to the case. 3. After a case 
has been declared admissible or, exceptionally, before the decision on admissibility, the Chamber 
may appoint one or more of its members or of the other judges of the Court, as its delegate or 
delegates, to conduct an inquiry, carry out an on-site investigation or take evidence in some other 
manner. The Chamber may also appoint any person or institution of its choice to assist the 
delegation in such manner as it sees fit.”).  
80  Id. 
81  DAVID HARRIS ET AL., LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 145 (2014).  
82  Kiyutin v. Russia, 2011-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 29, ¶ 67. 
83  Id. 
84  See CEDAW, Alyne da Silva, supra note 10. Amicus received from Latin-American and Caribbean 
Committee for the Defense of Women’s Rights (CLADEM), the International Commission of 
Jurists and from Amnesty International); Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW), Views: Communication No. 4/2004, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/36/D/4/2004 
(Aug. 29, 2006) (known as A.S. v. Hungary) [hereinafter CEDAW, A.S. v. Hungary] (Amicus 
received from the Center for Reproductive Rights, http://www.reproductiverights.org/ 
document/as-v-hungary-amicus-brief)); CEDAW, L.C. v. Peru, supra note 72 (Amicus received 
from the Health Equity and Law Clinic, International Reproductive and Sexual Health Law 
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Committee received three amicus curiae briefs, which provided the Committee 
with background information on maternal mortality in Brazil. 
Another example from the IACtHR relates to the case of Artavia Murillo 
involving a petition for in vitro fertilization (IVF). There, in addition to receiving 
amicus briefs, the IACtHR requested the testimony of “two deponents for 
informative purposes, four presumed victims, and seven expert witnesses to be 
received by affidavit … and summoned the parties to a public hearing ”85 to 
establish the existence of a scientific consensus that “there is embryonic loss in 
both a natural pregnancy and in the context of IVF.”86 
National case law illustrates how TMBs might utilize institutional 
collaborations and expertise specifically in health rights-related litigation.87 In 
Costa Rica, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court (also known as Sala 
IV) has the power to hear health rights claims, which include many claims on 
access to medicines.88 Since 2007, the Court has heard over 500 complaints per 
year on health of which over 150 complaints per year are on access to medicines.89 
The Court engages with medical studies and information in making 
determinations in these cases. In response to criticism about the Court’s ability to 
interpret medical studies and information, the Court sought the assistance of the 
Cochrane Collaboration through a technical cooperation plan.90 The technical 
cooperation agreement provides “the Sala IV with access to the Cochrane 
Collaboration’s extensive medical databases and provide[s] training to relevant 
court personnel to better understand specialized medical information.”91 
B.  Third Party Interveners to Provide Views on 
Contested Claims 
Health is not only a highly—and perhaps uniquely—technical domain 
among rights, but is also subject to enormous ethical contestation. Take for 
example, abortion and euthanasia rights. Thomas Keck refers to abortion as one 
                                                 
Programme, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto, https://opcedaw.files.wordpress.com/ 
2012/01/lc-v-peru-heal-clinic-amicus-brief.pdf). 
85  Artavia Murillo et al. (“In Vitro Fertilization”) v. Costa Rica, 2012 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C.) No. 
257, ¶ 11 (Nov. 28, 2012). 
86  Id. at ¶ 309. 
87  See Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], julio 31, 2008, Sentencia T-760/08, 
(Colom.); People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, 2004 (12) SCC 104. 
88  See Bruce Wilson, Costa Rica: Health Rights Litigation, in LITIGATING HEALTH RIGHTS: CAN COURTS 
BRING MORE JUSTICE TO HEALTH?, supra note 9, at 132; Norheim & Wilson, supra note 76. 
89  Norheim & Wilson, supra note 76. 
90  Id. 
91  Id. at 59. 
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of the “four key culture wars” in the U.S. involving “both judicial politics and 
democratic politics on both sides of the aisle.”92 The same is increasingly true in 
supra-national tribunals.93 Thus, in addition to the need for expert testimony, it is 
critical that the ESC Rights Committee encourage the submission of amicus 
briefs, as other supra-national tribunals and TMBs have done. Amicus briefs serve 
the purpose of providing both factual information, but also normative arguments 
concerning public interest matters, most notably in relation to litigation involving 
a systemic issue requiring structural reforms to laws, policies or programs in the 
health care system. Some advocates have argued that TMBs: 
have often been unable to adequately address the systemic issues raised by 
individual communications because of lack of information submitted on the 
broader issues at stake, and inability of organizations with expertise in the 
broader policy issues to intervene as amicus in these cases to provide 
information and analysis.94 
Some TMBs and other tribunals have taken steps to address these critiques. 
For example, many regional human rights courts also accept amicus curiae in 
health rights litigation, including the European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, and the African Court of Human and Peoples’ 
Rights. For example, the Inter-American Court accepts amicus briefs and has 
done so on health rights cases. In Artavia Murillo, the Court accepted numerous 
amicus briefs on a case examining Costa Rica’s ban on in vitro fertilization.95 
Indeed, the Court received 46 amicus curiae briefs.96 Moreover, in addition to 
accepting amicus briefs, the Inter-American Court also has the option of 
requesting affidavits from experts. In Artavia Murillo it requested affidavits from 
seven expert witnesses, and invited four of them to speak at a public hearing.97 
The Court cited heavily to expert witnesses in its decision; when determining what 
                                                 
92  THOMAS M. KECK, JUDICIAL POLITICS IN POLARIZED TIMES 8 (2014). 
93  See Liiri Oja & Alicia Yamin, “Woman” In the European Human Rights System: How is the Reproductive 
Rights Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights Constructing Narratives of Women’s Citizenship?, 
32 COLUM. J. GENDER & L (forthcoming); Alvaro Paul, Controversial Conceptions: The Unborn and the 
American Convention on Human Rights, 9 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L. L. REV. 209 (2012). 
94  Langford et al., supra note 41. 
95  See, for example, Brief for The Human Rights Clinic at The University of Texas School of Law and 
The Equal Rights Trust as Amici Curiae, Artavia Murillo et al., supra note 85, 
http://www.equalrightstrust.org/ertdocumentbank/ERT_Amicus_Brief_Murillo.pdf; Brief of 
The Program for the Study of Reproductive Justice in the Information Society Project at Yale Law 
School as Amici Curiae, Artavia Murillo et al., supra note 85, http://isp.yale.edu/sites/ 
default/files/BRIEF%20OF%20YALE%20ISP_GRETEL%20ARTAVIA%20MURILLO%20Y.
%20OTROS%20v.%20COSTA%20RICA_English.pdf; Brief for Alliance Defense Fund et al. as 
Amici Curiae, Artavia Murillo et al. supra note 85, http://www.adfmedia.org/files/IVF-
CostaRicaAmicus-English.pdf. 
96  Artavia Murillo, supra note 85, at ¶ 13. 
97  Id. at ¶¶ 11–12. 
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constitutes a “person” for purposes of the right to life, the Court took expert 
opinions into account.98  
VI.  SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF HEALTH TO CONSIDER IN 
APPROACHES TO REASONABLENESS  
Under the Optional Protocol, the ESC Rights Committee decides the 
reasonableness of state actions to respect, protect, and adopt measures to 
progressively fulfill the right to health, as opposed to whether an action falls within 
the state’s “margin of appreciation” as under the European Convention. The 
Optional Protocol provides:  
[w]hen examining communications under the present Protocol, the 
Committee shall consider the reasonableness of the steps taken by the State 
Party in accordance with part of the Covenant. In doing so, the Committee 
shall bear in mind that the State Party may adopt a range of possible policy 
measures for the implementation of the rights set forth in the Covenant.99  
Two issues stand out with respect to how the ESC Rights Committee, as 
well as other TMBs, might approach reasonableness standards in health rights 
cases. The first relates to how far how rigorous or deferential the scrutiny of 
government action will be, and applies to all rights. The second, however, relates 
to the fact that in health specifically, substantive equality requires assessments of 
other dimensions of human disadvantage than in many rights. Here, we focus on 
the second issue. 
A.  Deference to Political Organs in Assessing St ate Action 
First, although “reasonableness” differs from “margin of appreciation” 
under international law, both recognize that the political organs of government 
have an array of options to choose from in implementing rights, all of which may 
be compliant with their obligations. Although some national courts following the 
reasonableness standard simply examine whether the state has created a law or 
policy, it is increasingly recognized that such formalism does not produce effective 
enjoyment of rights in practice; therefore, with greater frequency, domestic courts 
are turning to examine the reasonableness of state measures to implement policies 
as well.100  
For example, the South African Constitutional Court has established two 
principles for assessing reasonableness. First, the court is guided by human rights 
                                                 
98  Id. at ¶ 178 (stating “in the instant case, the parties also forwarded as evidence a series of scientific 
articles and expert opinions that will be used in the following paragraphs to determine the scope of 
the literal interpretation of the terms ‘conception,’ ‘person’ and ‘human being’”). 
99  Optional Protocol to ESC Rights Committee, supra note 40, art. 8(4). 
100  See Government of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom 2000 (1) SA 46 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
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law as enumerated in the Constitution to determine whether the policy was 
reasonable,101 and second, the Court looks at the extent and effects of the 
implementation of the government measure, not its intent.102 In assessing the 
reasonableness of implementation, the Court will examine multiple aspects 
including, inter alia, adequately allocated responsibilities,103 appropriate allocation 
of financial and human resources,104 possible national level legislation,105 policies 
and programs to support implementation of legislation,106 and consideration of 
economic, social and historical factors in determining measures.107 In the Treatment 
Action Campaign case, involving the roll-out of a prevention of Mother-to-Child 
Transmission Program for HIV/AIDS, the South African Constitutional Court 
systematically applied the reasonableness standards it had previously established 
to each rationale put forward by the government, and, echoing its earlier decisions, 
declined to expand a reasonableness analysis to include minimum core standards 
or budget allocation.108  
In Colombia, the Constitutional Court has established that “the 
constitutional obligations of programmatic character, derived from a fundamental 
right, are violated when the entity responsible for guaranteeing the enjoyment of 
a right does not even provide a program or a public policy that would permit 
the progressive advancement in the fulfillment of its corresponding 
obligations[ . . . .]”109 In the T-760/08 case, which called for restructuring aspects 
of the health system in keeping with the right to health, the Constitutional Court 
further noted that if a  
judge finds a violation of the programmatic facet of a fundamental right, he 
must protect that fundamental right by adopting orders to ensure its effective 
enjoyment. [But such orders should be] respectful of the process of public 
debate, decision and policy implementation, characteristic of a democracy. 
Therefore, it is not his duty to tell the responsible authority, specifically, 
what should be appropriate and necessary to ensure the effective 
enjoyment of the right, but rather he must adopt the decisions and orders 
to ensure that such measures are taken, promoting at the same time citizen 
participation.110  
                                                 
101  See id. at ¶ 44.  
102  See Porter, supra note 75; Grootboom, supra note 100, at ¶ 42. 
103  Grootboom, supra note 100, at ¶ 39.  
104  Id. 
105  Id. at ¶ 40.  
106  Id. at ¶ 42.  
107  Id. at ¶ 43.  
108  Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA 721 ¶ 37 (S. Afr.). 
109 Sentencia T-760/08, supra note 87, at ¶ 3.3.9. 
110  Id. at ¶ 3.3.14. 
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In a 2014 decision relating to the Statutory Law on Health that was adopted 
in light of T-760/08, the Constitutional Court held the State’s obligation to 
regulate pharmaceuticals and ensure affordable access includes all policies from 
manufacture through distribution to ultimate access to, and consumption of, the 
medications.111 
B.  Assessing State Actions for Substantive Equality  
Although there are varying levels of inquiry into the implementation of laws 
and policies, determinations of the reasonableness of state actions often turn on 
whether there are discriminatory intent or impacts, as well as whether a given 
policy adequately considers the most disadvantaged in society.112 This is where 
health rights litigation becomes uniquely complex in terms of the demands of 
distributive justice. In addition to an assessment of the compliance of government 
actions with the right to health, TMBs must also assess other dimensions of 
human disadvantage in order to ensure substantive equality of health rights.113  
Evaluating formal equality requires the TMB to evaluate whether the 
petitioner is treated in the same manner as similarly situated people, and that there 
be no arbitrary differentiation based upon race, religion, gender and the like. This 
evaluation is quite straightforward and one of these authors has argued elsewhere 
that formal equality should call for judicial inquiry into the universalizability of 
services.114 Thus, for example, ordering certain forms of care, including the 
treatment of cancer abroad in the case of Camila Abuabara, could be construed 
as granting a privilege rather than enforcing a right. Indeed, the ESC Rights 
Committee has noted in its General Comment 14 that inappropriate health 
resource allocation can lead to discrimination that may not be overt. For example, 
investments “should not disproportionately favour expensive curative health 
services which are often accessible only to a small, privileged fraction of the 
population, rather than primary and preventive health care benefiting a far larger 
part of the population.”115 
Substantive equality, however, requires the TMB to evaluate whether 
differently situated people are treated in such a way that they can equally enjoy the 
right to health.116 The ESC Rights Committee has stated that “[b]y virtue of 
                                                 
111  Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], marzo 11, 2014, Sentencia C-131/14, (Colom.). 
112  See Grootboom, supra note 100. 
113  CESCR General Comment No. 14, supra note 17. 
114  See Yamin & Lander, supra note 37; YAMIN, supra note 37. 
115  CESCR, General Comment No. 14, supra note 17 at ¶ 18–19. 
116  CESCR, General Comment No. 20: Non-Discrimination in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
¶ 8(b), 42nd Sess., U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/20 (July 2, 2009) (explaining that for substantive 
discrimination, “[t]he effective enjoyment of Covenant rights is often influenced by whether a 
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paragraph 2 of its article 2 and of its article 3, the Covenant proscribes any 
discrimination in access to health care and underlying determinants of health, as 
well as to means and entitlements for their procurement.”117 However, health 
equality is a more multi-dimensional concept than equality with respect to many 
other rights. “An analysis of equality in health must consider social inequalities, 
but also other factors such as severity of illness.”118 Indeed, John Rawls was 
famously criticized in his Theory of Justice for not determining who is worse off—a 
very ill person or a healthy person who has fewer resources.119 Norman Daniels et 
al. explain that 
[a] right to health or health care is a special case of [Rawls’s] right to fair 
equality of opportunity. . . . This conception of a right to health or health care 
starts with the assumption that we have a right to fair equality of opportunity 
and that the protection of our health makes a significant if limited 
contribution to preserving those opportunities.120 
In a similar vein, Amartya Sen has pointed out that it is important to consider 
the “conversion gap” that exists for certain people to enjoy health as well as other 
“capabilities”.121 For example, a person with a disability may require additional 
resources to enjoy the same level of meaningful access to care, as well as equal 
enjoyment of the right. Think, for instance, of the need for sign language 
interpretation, a ramp for access to a facility, or for prosthetics or wheelchairs so 
that a person with a disability can enjoy the same range of opportunities that a 
person of equal financial means without a disability would have. The CRPD itself 
states that  
[i]n order to promote equality and eliminate discrimination, States Parties 
shall take all appropriate steps to ensure that reasonable accommodation is 
provided [where reasonable accommodations are] necessary and appropriate 
modification and adjustments not imposing a disproportionate or undue 
burden, where needed in a particular case, to ensure to persons with 
disabilities the enjoyment or exercise on an equal basis with others of all 
human rights and fundamental freedoms.122  
                                                 
person is a member of a group characterized by the prohibited grounds of discrimination. 
Eliminating discrimination in practice requires paying sufficient attention to groups of individuals 
which suffer historical or persistent prejudice instead of merely comparing the formal treatment 
of individuals in similar situations.”). 
117  CESCR General Comment No. 14, supra note 17, at ¶ 18. 
118  Yamin & Norheim, supra note 13, at 312. 
119  Id.; Kenneth Arrow, Rawls’s Principle of Just Saving, 75.4 SWEDISH J. ECON. 323 (1973). 
120  Norman Daniels et al., Role of the Courts in the Progressive Realization of the Right to Health: Between the 
Threat and the Promise of Judicialization in Mexico, 1 HEALTH SYSTEMS & REFORM 229, 230 (2015).  
121  See generally AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999). 
122  Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature Dec. 18, 1990, art. 5(3) 
2515 U.N.T.S. 3. 
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The case of Camila Abuabara shows how difficult such balances can be, and 
how contested. Many theories of prioritarianism in relation to distributive justice 
require that some weight be placed upon providing for those who are worst off in 
the conditions from which they are suffering. As a legal matter, ethical criteria 
must be balanced in a manner that takes into account certain constitutional 
guarantees. These include those that on their face appear to give rights to children 
under 18 years of age that are not subject to resource constraints or progressive 
realization. Camila was a young adult, but she easily could have been diagnosed 
with acute lymphoblastic leukemia as a child. Indeed, the great majority of cases 
occur in children under 15.123 As children are granted special consideration under 
both international and some domestic law, cost-effectiveness criteria and burden 
of disease calculations need also be balanced with legal provisions in place.124  
In short, the weighing of different criteria—including cost-effectiveness and 
priority to the worst off, as well as how many resources will be assigned to 
marginalized populations as opposed to simply trying to improve aggregate 
population health—are not merely technical questions. They are inherently 
normative—and deeply ethically contested.125 As such, courts, and in turn supra-
national tribunals, have a special role in ensuring the measures adopted by a state 
are consistent with fundamental normative commitments, including respect for 
the equal dignity of all human beings.126 Additionally, they have a role to play in 
ensuring that the process whereby the priorities have been set is transparent and 
legitimate, and includes participation of affected communities as well as 
opportunities for appeal in light of new information.127 However, we are not 
arguing for supra-national tribunals to define health policy priorities or 
implementation. As suggested by the Colombian Constitutional Court in T-
                                                 
123  NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF HEALTH: NATIONAL CANCER INSTITUTE, SURVEILLANCE, 
EPIDEMIOLOGY, AND END RESULTS PROGRAM (SEER), SEER Cancer Statistics Review, 1975–2012: 
Percent of New Cases by Age Group: Acute Lymphocytic Leukemia, http://seer.cancer.gov/ 
statfacts/html/alyl.html (57.6% of new cases occur under the age of 20). See also NATIONAL 
CANCER INSTITUTE, Childhood Acute Lymphoblastic Leukemia Treatment – for Health Professionals (PDQ), 
http://www.cancer.gov/types/leukemia/hp/child-all-treatment-pdq#link/_7_toc (“A sharp peak 
in ALL incidence is observed among children aged 2 to 3 years (>90 cases per 1 million per year), 
with rates decreasing to fewer than 30 cases per 1 million by age 8 years.”). 
124  See generally Convention on the Rights of the Child, Sept. 2, 1990, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (granting children 
numerous special protections in state action). 
125  See NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH: MEETING HEALTH NEEDS FAIRLY 11 (2007) (seeking to 
answer “how can we meet health needs fairly under resource constraints”). 
126  See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 1, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. 
Mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) (stating that “[a]ll human beings are born free and equal in dignity 
and rights”). 
127  See CESCR General Comment No. 14, supra note 17, at ¶ 54 (upholding “the right of individuals 
and groups to participate in decision-making processes [regarding national health strategies]”). 
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760/08, in our view, judicial decisions at both national and international levels 
should be “respectful of the process of public debate, decision and policy 
implementation, characteristic of a democracy” recognizing not only the reality of 
resource constraints, but also that an array of different rankings of ethical criteria 
can be deemed “reasonable” under international law.128 
VII.  SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF HEALTH TO CONSIDER IN 
APPROACHES TO REMEDIES AND FOLLOW-UP  
Remedies may take multiple forms and the ESC Rights Committee will likely 
consider using more than one form of remedy. Generally, TMBs and international 
courts consider three types of remedies: restitution; accountability mechanisms to 
ensure non-repetition of violations; and structural remedies, sometimes with 
additional provisions to assist or monitor implementation.129 In evaluating the 
menu of remedies available to the ESC Rights Committee in relation to health-
related rights, it is especially important that both the direct and indirect effects be 
considered carefully. Remedies will almost invariably affect not just the individual 
or group of litigants but will also have far-reaching normative and indirect impacts. 
Moreover, not only the framing of the recourse, but the degree of implementation 
on the ground, will have a bearing on the legitimacy and authority of the ESC 
Rights Committee, or another supra-national tribunal. 
A.  Restitutive Remedies 
Restitutive remedies, generally in the form of reparations, are routinely 
provided by supra-national tribunals to complainants suffering harm from 
violations of their civil and political rights. Increasingly there is precedent for such 
                                                 
128  Sentencia T-760, supra note 87. See also KEITH SYRETT, LAW, LEGITIMACY AND THE RATIONING OF 
HEALTH CARE: A CONTEXTUAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 108 (2007) (“The role of the four 
conditions of ‘accountability for reasonableness’ as ‘connective tissue to . . . a broader democratic 
process’ comes about by way of the contribution which they can make to enhancing 
understanding . . . of the need to set limits on access to medical services and treatments, and of the 
types of evidence, grounds and conditions which may appropriately play a part in rationing 
decisions. Compliance wiht the model consequently serves an ‘educative function’: that is, it 
facilitates ‘social learning about limits.’”). See generally SYRETT, at 108–119. 
129  See CESCR, An Evaluation of the Obligation to Take Steps to the “Maximum of Available 
Resources” Under an Optional Protocol to the Covenant, ¶ 54, 38th Sess., U.N. Doc. 
E/C.12/2007/1 (May 10, 2007) (recommending “restitution . . . [c]alling upon the State party to 
remedy the circumstances leading to a violation . . . [or] mechanism[s] to ensure the ongoing 
accountability of the State party) in response to violations). See also ESCR-NET, CLAIMING 
WOMEN’S ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: PART FOUR: OPTIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE 
CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN at 46–
47, http://www.escr-net.org/sites/default/files/ESCR-NET-Manual-Booklet-3.pdf (providing a 
menu of options that the CEDAW Committee utilizes underits Optional Protocol). 
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restitution in health-related cases. In the Alyne da Silva v. Brazil case, the CEDAW 
Committee requested that Brazil “provide appropriate reparation, including 
adequate financial compensation” to the complainant’s family. 130 The case was 
filed in November 2007 and the parties to the case did not finalize an agreement 
outlining financial reparations until 2014, when the CEDAW Committee 
approved the agreement.131 On March 25, 2014, the Brazilian government held a 
public ceremony where it provided monetary reparations to the mother of the 
complainant.132 Monetary compensation to Alyne’s daughter, Alice, is still 
pending. Restitution and reparations can also take the form of services, such as 
special rehabilitative or other health services.133 
B.  Structural Remedies  
Structural remedies are appropriate for systematic violations, where complex 
orders relating to institutions and processes are involved, rather than dictating 
specific outcomes. Such remedies can be called for at the same time as restitution 
is ordered.134 For example, in the Alyne da Silva v. Brazil case, the CEDAW 
Committee ordered seven general remedies including, inter alia, “reduc[ing] 
maternal deaths through the implementation of the National Pact for the 
Reduction of Maternal Mortality.”135  
When issuing general and structural recommendations, the ESC Rights 
Committee will be straddling concerns about meaningful engagement with the 
                                                 
130  CEDAW, Alyne da Silva, supra note 10, at 21. See also SYRETT, supra note 128. 
131  Press Release, Center for Reproductive Rights, Brazil Takes Step to Implement Historic United 
Nations Ruling in Maternal Death Case: United Nations Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) Approves Monetary Reparations Agreement with 
Brazilian Government for the Mother of Alyne da Silva Pimentel (Mar. 11, 2014), 
http://reproductiverights.org/en/press-room/Brazil-Takes-Step-to-Implement-Historic-United-
Nations-Ruling-in-Maternal-Death-Case%20. 
132  Press Release, Center for Reproductive Rights, Brazilian Government Gives Monetary Reparations 
As Part of Historical United Nations Maternal Death Case (Mar. 25, 2014), available at 
http://www.reproductiverights.org/press-room/brazilian-government-gives-monetary-
reparations-as-part-of-historic-united-nations-matern. 
133  See Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C.) No. 140, at 144 (Jan. 31, 
2006); M.M. v. Peru, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Report No. 69/14, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.151, doc. 34 (July 
25, 2014) (friendly settlement); CEDAW, L.C. v. Peru, supra note 72; HRC, K.L. v. Peru, supra note 
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state and encroaching upon the state’s right to discern legislative and 
administrative means through which to implement rights, similar to the balanced 
deference required under the reasonableness standard. As Bruce Porter notes, 
“[r]emedies will often need to recommend a process through which compliance 
can be achieved, rather than recommending the precise details of the solution.”136  
However, this issue is not unique to ESC rights. Although the Optional 
Protocol states that the ESC Rights Committee may “decline to consider a 
communication where it does not reveal that the author has suffered a clear 
disadvantage, unless the Committee considers that the communication raises a 
serious issue of general importance,”137 remedying individual violations will often 
require identifying underlying structural factors and such broad remedies have 
been effectively used by other TMBs. Under the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, 
the Human Rights Committee is permitted to provide a general recommendation 
or remedy, “allowing the State party a certain discretion in implementation subject 
to its own legal or administrative system but may include, inter alia, an amendment 
to legislation, the provision of compensation, retrial, or release or early release of 
the [petitioner].”138 Similarly, the Inter-American system uses structural remedies 
including “changes to policies, or implementation of measures for the protection 
of groups, organization of social services, public services, or the supply of goods 
to groups or communities, including the recognition of titles or collective 
rights.”139 Even in individual cases, such as that of Camila, presumably general 
recommendations would address the systemic failures in oversight of the health 
system. 
C. Monitoring Implementation of Structural Remedies  
However, in the context of adjudicating cases under the Optional Protocol, 
the ESC Rights Committee will have to be strategic in selecting remedies that are 
realistic and can be monitored effectively. Low levels of implementation or 
efficacy of remedies may potentially undermine the credibility of the ESC Rights 
Committee. This is further compounded because ESC rights are subjected to the 
standard of progressive realization, which may be used as an explanation for slow 
compliance with a structural recommendation. The highly technical nature of 
health, as well as the powerful interests involved in the health sector, where there 
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are enormous asymmetries of information and power, heighten the need to 
carefully devise forms of effectively monitoring structural recommendations. 
A review of supra-national litigation demonstrates that obstacles relating to 
the effective use of structural recommendations or remedies include the capacity 
of the TMB or supra-national tribunal to follow-up on and monitor 
implementation,140 the lack of a role for civil society in the follow-up, and the 
point at which the TMB determines that a state has complied with the decision. 
Traditionally, TMBs have taken a formalistic approach to oversight of 
implementation of cases, for example through the establishment of a government 
committee.141 The rationale for this approach may have been partially attributable 
to a conceptual approach to the law, and partially dictated by the capacity of the 
TMB or supra-national tribunal. 
However, differing experiences and approaches of supra-national tribunals 
to date provide valuable lessons for the use of innovative oversight mechanisms 
and more meaningful follow-up regarding substantive compliance with 
recommendations and decisions. For example, implementation of decisions from 
the European Court of Human Rights are monitored by a political body, the 
Committee of Ministers, whereas the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
itself monitors compliance with its judgments.142 The IACtHR has increasingly 
utilized structural remedies in decisions but has had persistent “low levels of 
effectiveness” which “may lead to rethinking the entire Inter-American Human 
Rights System and may entail costs in terms of the Court’s legitimacy.”143 Former 
member of the Inter-American Commission Victor Abramovich argued in 2007 
that “[t]he truth is that the Inter-American Human Rights System has embarked 
on the development of a structural litigation model for the protection of groups 
without having first honed and discussed in depth the limits or potential of its 
procedural rules, its system of remedies and its mechanisms to follow up and 
monitor decisions.”144 However, in no small measure as a response to critiques by 
leading scholars and practitioners such as Abramovich, the IACtHR established 
follow-up procedures in 2009145 and it is now common practice for the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights to issue reports where it outlines a state’s 
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compliance with judgments issued by the court.146 The follow-up procedures 
authorize the Court to require state reports on implementation and to respond 
with observations, to seek additional information on implementation through 
alternate sources, to convene hearings with the State and victims, and to issue 
orders based upon its determination of compliance.147 For example, in Panchito 
Lopez, a case brought on behalf of 4,000 children kept in inhuman conditions at a 
juvenile detention center, the Court inter alia ordered the State to draft a 
comprehensive policy on children in conflict of the law and has issued four orders 
since its original decision in 2004.148 
The IACHR has the possibility of holding informal follow-up meetings in 
the countries, with the presence of the countries’ rapporteurs. We agree with 
Abramovich and other commentators that “[h]olding such working meetings in 
the countries facilitates the participation of victims and organizations, as well as 
of the relevant State agencies responsible for implementing orders, all of which 
expedites implementation of decisions.”149 Further, we believe that translating 
international judgments into political policies that are institutionalized and 
implemented in practice calls for catalyzing the active engagement of public 
agencies, civil society, and sometimes national courts or human rights institutions, 
which are in the position to monitor the situation in practice.150 
For example, the success of the ECtHR in utilizing what Cali and Koch term 
as a “deliberative compliance model” is worthy of note.151 The ECtHR does not 
provide specific details about what actions a state should take to comply with 
decisions requesting structural remedies. Under Article 46 of the Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, states are obligated 
to “abide by the final judgment of the Court.”152 
[T]his obligation entails, over and above the payment of any sums 
awarded by the Court, the adoption by the authorities of the respondent 
State, where required: of individual measures to put an end to violations 
established and erase their consequences so as to achieve as far as 
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possible restitutio in integrum; and of general measures preventing 
similar violations.153 
As in the European system, states have a “margin of appreciation” as to what 
means they should use to ensure compliance with the judgment.154 In A, B. and C, 
an Irish case before the ECHR adjudicating access to abortion, the Court simply 
ruled that Ireland’s criteria for legal access to abortion when the life of the mother 
is at risk was violated with regard to applicant 3 because there “was no accessible 
and effective procedure to enable her to establish whether she qualified for a 
lawful termination of pregnancy in accordance with Irish law.”155 The state must 
decide how best to ensure that general measures are taken to prevent similar 
violations in the future. In this case, Ireland commissioned an expert group with 
“appropriate medical, legal, regulatory and administrative expertise” to provide 
recommendations on options to implement the judgment.156 
Second, the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms provides that the Committee of Ministers shall supervise 
the execution of the final judgment of the Court.157 The Committee of Ministers 
of the Council of Europe158 works with states in determining what means they 
should pursue in ensuring compliance with individual and general measures, 
which constitutes a ”deliberative” process159 between a political body, the State 
and possibly the Court (if requested by Committee of Ministers160). In the case of 
A. B. and C, Ireland submitted the expert report to the Committee of Ministers 
and then proceeded to update the Committee of Ministers of its action plan 
including specific timetables.161 After Ireland selected legislation as the method of 
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implementation, the Committee “noted with satisfaction that the authorities [had] 
decided to implement the judgment by way of legislation and regulations” and 
invited the authorities to keep it informed of developments, including on the 
content of the legislation and on the timetable for its adoption.162 The Committee 
of Ministers also permits NGOs and National Institutions for the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights (NHRIs) to submit communications concerning the 
action plan.163 
Lastly, the European Court of Human Rights recently introduced pilot 
judgments as a method to address systemic issues. The court explains that 
[t]he pilot judgment procedure was developed as a technique of identifying 
the structural problems underlying repetitive cases against many countries 
and imposing an obligation on States to address those problems. Where the 
Court receives several applications that share a root cause, it can select one 
or more for priority treatment under the pilot procedure.164 
In these cases, the Committee of Ministers may also confer with the 
Department for the Execution of Judgments to work with states to identify how 
to implement the Court’s decisions. However, in these cases the Court may not 
completely defer to the State in how to implement; “[t]he Court may consider it 
necessary, however, under Article 46 § 1, to give Governments guidance with a 
view to solving a systemic or structural problem.”165 During the period of 
implementation, the court may adjourn all related cases while the State works to 
implement the judgment.166 “The Court can, however, resume examining 
adjourned cases whenever the interests of justice so require.”167 
The UN human rights TMBs have also established committees to monitor 
compliance with their decisions, including the Human Rights Committee in 
1990,168 the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in 2008,169 
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the Committee against Torture in 2002,170 and the Committee on the Elimination 
of Discrimination against Women through its Optional Protocol.171 In 1990, the 
UN Human Rights Committee established an entity, entitled a Special Rapporteur, 
with the mandate to monitor state party compliance with its views under the 
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.172 
As the recommendations and views of the ESC Rights Committee, as with other 
TMBs, will not be legally binding upon the States but rather are recommendations 
that provide an “authoritative interpretation of the treaty concerned,”173 other 
TMBs have devised mechanisms to encourage compliance. In the case of the 
HRC, “failure by a State party to implement the Views of the Committee in a 
given case becomes a matter of public record through the publication of the 
Committee’s decisions in, inter alia, its annual reports to the General Assembly.”174 
Moreover, the Special Rapporteur engages with the states through written 
representations, personal meetings with diplomatic representatives of the State 
party concerned including Permanent Missions to the UN, and even follow-up 
missions to the State parties.175 The Human Rights Committee itself may also 
follow-up with the State party through its periodic report.176 However, these 
procedures have proven weak in relation to implementation of some health-
related decisions. For example, the plaintiffs took the abortion case of L.C. v. Peru 
to the CEDAW Committee as opposed to the HRC, largely because of lack of 
implementation of the Human Rights Committee’s decision in another abortion 
case, K.L. v. Peru.177 
The Rules of Procedure of the CEDAW Committee permit the designation 
of a Special Rapporteur or working group to follow-up on its views and authorizes 
them to “make such contacts and take such action as may be appropriate for the 
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due performance of their assigned functions.”178 For example, the CEDAW 
Committee has issued views that recommend structural remedies for health rights 
violations. In A.S. v. Hungary, a case before the CEDAW Committee alleging 
forced sterilization of a minority Roma woman,179 the CEDAW Committee 
recommended remedies that included legislative and policy reviews and changes 
concerning informed consent for sterilizations. Recommendations included 
reviewing domestic legislation and monitoring of health centers to ensure proper 
administration of informed consent and sanctions should there be violations.180 
While the state did take some measures, it argued that “there was no need to 
amend its legislation arguing, inter alia, that the general provisions on information 
were also applicable for sterilizations performed for health reasons and that, 
therefore, special information was not necessary.”181 In order to encourage 
compliance, the CEDAW Committee utilized Special Rapporteurs to urge 
compliance with the recommendations despite the state’s objections.182 However, 
the number and length of communications between the Special Rapporteurs, the 
State, the Committee, the State representative at the UN, and the Permanent 
Representative of Hungary to the UN, demonstrate the challenges that these 
follow-up procedures face. While the state notified the CEDAW Committee on 
April 12, 2007 of its views, the Special Rapporteurs had 6 separate formal 
communications with officials over 16 months.183 The CEDAW Committee 
considered the communications ongoing until 2009 when the government agreed 
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to compensate A.S., in accordance with the CEDAW Committee’s 
recommendations.184 
The CEDAW Committee faced similar constraints in pursuing 
implementation of its views in Alyne da Silva v. Brazil.185 In this case, in addition to 
reparations, the CEDAW Committee issued recommendations with respect to 
structural reforms to ensure equitable access to maternal healthcare and to prevent 
discrimination leading to maternal mortality.186 The state took multiple steps to 
implement the CEDAW Committee decision, including the creation of an Inter-
Ministerial Working Group in May 2013 and the adoption of an array of initiatives 
and policies.187 Nevertheless, the petitioner, Center for Reproductive Rights, 
remained concerned with respect to the lack of effective implementation. In a 
ground-breaking initiative, a Technical Follow-Up Mission relating to this case, 
which included one of these authors (AEY), went to Brazil in July 2015, with the 
government’s permission to assess technical issues in relation to the 
implementation of the structural recommendations. The goal of such a Technical 
Follow-Up was/is to catalyze engagement by national-level institutions in 
processes to further advance effective enjoyment of health rights in practice. 
State-provided verification of compliance with TMBs’ decisions are limited, 
and we agree with Abramovich and other commentators that the effective 
implementation of structural remedies by supra-national tribunals calls for 
catalyzing the engagement of domestic actors, such as national agencies, 
judiciaries, national human rights institutions and civil society institutions.188 
Moreover, just as in the adjudicatory phase, the evaluation of implementation in 
health rights cases often calls for technical expertise, and therefore third-party 
technical follow-up reviews can provide valuable support to the TMB or supra-
national tribunal to enhance effective implementation. In this regard, some 
national courts provide potential examples for the ESC Rights Committee and 
other supra-national tribunals. 
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For example, the Colombia Constitutional Court appointed “voluntary 
independent technical experts” (including one of these authors, AEY) for the 
implementation phase of its structural judgment on the health system, T-760/08, 
as it did in the earlier structural judgment regarding displaced persons, T-
025/04.189 The Court has held numerous in-person and/or virtual meetings with 
the voluntary independent technical experts, who include groups of patients and 
other civil society organizations as well as academics and standard “experts” to 
get input from them, afford spaces for interchange of views, and to ensure that it 
has sufficient information to monitor effective compliance with the judgment. 
The involvement of these experts, and other members of civil society, has proven 
crucial in fostering the translation of the judicial orders into legislation and public 
policies. Indeed, a number of the independent experts appointed by the Court, 
including the civil society coalition, called the “Follow-up Commission,” and the 
“Alliance for the Right to Health” were engaged in drafting and lobbying for 
legislative proposals that were enshrined in the Statutory Law on Health, enacted 
in 2015, as a consequence of the original judgment.190 
If the ESC Rights Committee or other TMBs were to pursue the 
appointment of voluntary independent experts, or some sort of follow-up 
commission, consent would need to be obtained by the state concerned, as was 
the case in the ad hoc Alyne follow-up visit mentioned above. Further, criteria 
regarding qualifications would need to be established, and rigorously met. 
Moreover, we believe that it is fundamental that such follow-up commissions 
pursue aims that are not seen as part of the contentious case, but rather as 
catalyzing the actions and involvement of state and civil society actors at the 
domestic level, and fostering deliberative processes regarding the paths toward 
implementation of the judgments. Based upon evidence from both regional and 
national experiences, we believe that such “follow-up” experts or commissions, if 
and when they are structured with clear criteria for adjudging compliance and ends 
to follow-up, can potentially play an important role in closing the capacity gaps 
that TMBs face with respect to monitoring more than formalistic implementation 
of structural orders. 
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In sum, for reasons of capacity and resources, as well as formalistic 
approaches to remedies and compliance, implementation of the judgments of 
TMBs and supra-national tribunals have often been monitored in limited ways. 
Nonetheless, there are multiple examples of more deliberative remedies, as well 
as innovative possibilities for monitoring implementation at the regional and 
national level. If follow-up is to go beyond such formalism, it must have as its 
objective going beyond the logic of compliance to re-engage national institutions, 
including civil society actors, the judiciary and other accountability mechanisms, 
and promoting constructive deliberation at the national level.191 Further, in paying 
close attention to the implementation and impacts of their decisions at national 
level, the ESC Rights Committee and other supra-national tribunals can 
potentially strengthen the normative as well as social legitimacy of international 
law. 
VIII.  CONCLUSIONS  
As Camila’s case poignantly illustrates, perhaps adjudication on no other 
right so consistently calls for determinations of what lies within the purview of 
state and societal responsibility, and what matters of life and death significance 
may be lamented as human tragedies.192 Moreover, as technology inexorably 
develops and demographic and epidemiologic trends evolve constantly toward a 
heavier burden of non-communicable diseases, the contours of what state 
obligations are entailed under a “right to health” are in constant flux, and subject 
to contestation on ideological, ethical and economic grounds. 
In this article we have set out how various supra-national tribunals have 
addressed different issues in the adjudication of health-related rights, and have 
offered proposals in relation to some special considerations posed by health-
related cases for supra-national tribunals. We first argued for the importance of 
an approach to adjudication that both recognizes underlying determinants and 
delimits the obligations of the health sector by explicitly acknowledging the 
interdependence and indivisibility of health with human rights. Second, after 
reviewing some lessons from other supra-national tribunals, we proposed 
considerations for the ESC Rights Committee to consider as constituting 
“exceptional circumstances” for the order of interim measures in a health-rights 
related case. Third, we noted the critical role of technical evidence in health rights 
cases, and the need for varying types of third-party interventions to address the 
fundamental moral contestation presented by many health-related rights cases. 
Fourth, we asserted that considerations of substantive equality in relation to 
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health-related rights go beyond accounting for social marginalization or 
discrimination faced by certain populations to examining priorities in relation to 
the “worst off” in terms of the seriousness of conditions, and coming to careful 
balances that reinforce democratic processes. Finally, we asserted the need for 
developing innovative forms of monitoring and supervision of structural remedies 
by the ESC Rights Committee and other TMBs, in line with the experiences of 
some national and supra-national tribunals, in order to foster effective compliance 
and catalyze processes to enhance the ultimate impact of judgments, which in turn 
bears on the legitimacy of international human rights law and institutions. 
